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Abstract
Human rights frameworks afford everyone the right to health and the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications. Both come together to create state obligations to ensure access
to medicines and other health technologies. Though the impact of patents on access to high-quality,
affordable medicines and health technologies has been well described, there has been little attention to the
impact of trade secrecy law in this context. In this paper, we describe how trade secrecy protection comes
into conflict with access to medicines—for example, by preventing researchers from accessing clinical
trial data, undermining the scale-up of manufacturing in pandemics, and deterring whistleblowers
from reporting industry misconduct. The paper proposes measures to diminish the conflict between
trade secrecy and health that are consistent with international law and will advance health without
undermining innovation.
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Introduction
The right to health is widely recognized in international treaties,1 and every state has ratified at least
one of the several international agreements that recognize it.2 The affirmative right to health necessarily
entails access to medicines and other health technologies such as vaccines and diagnostics, as recognized
by international bodies and domestic courts alike.3
(In this paper, we use the shorthand “access to
medicines” to refer to access to a variety of health
technologies, including vaccines and diagnostics.)
Access to medicines, in turn, requires institutional
and legal arrangements that ensure that appropriate
medicines are developed, tested, and made available
equitably and at affordable prices.
Realizing health rights, as one of us has
emphasized, requires interventions in law and
political economy.4 Political economy approaches
to law recognize that law constructs markets and
that the shape law gives to markets implicates
values of equality and democracy—for example,
by shaping who has access to health technologies.
Intellectual property law is a key component of how
law structures markets in, and access to, scientific
advances. Patents, for example, are legally granted
temporary monopolies that create both incentives
for the development of medicines and barriers to
affordable medicines. Safeguarding the right to
health requires the international community and
individual states to balance, adjust, or even override intellectual property provisions.
A great deal of work has been done to illuminate the relationship between patents and access
to medicines. But the role that trade secrecy law,
another type of intellectual property, plays in limiting access to quality and affordable medicines has
received far less attention. An emerging literature
has begun to explicate how the protection of trade
secrets and confidential corporate information creates barriers to data and information that the public
has vital interests in accessing, including information about voting technologies, criminal justice
and surveillance technologies, and environmental
hazards. This opaqueness compromises important
public interests in democratic accountability and
public health and safety.5 This paper adds to that
130
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literature, detailing how trade secrecy can also impede access to information that is needed to ensure
quality, affordable medicines, thereby burdening
the public’s right to health and its right to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications.6
As we describe, trade secrecy may be invoked in
a manner that prevents public access to clinical
trial data, drug pricing data, evidence of corporate
wrongdoing, manufacturing information needed
to decentralize production, or biologic resources
important to treatment and vaccine development.
Access to these resources is particularly acute
now, while the world is struggling to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic. On October 2, 2020, India
and South Africa submitted a communication to
the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) proposing a waiver of sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of part II of the TRIPS Agreement
in order to support measures to prevent, treat, and
contain COVID-19.7 The proposal suggests waiving
protections of undisclosed information, described
in TRIPS section 7. This is of special importance due
to the rapid development of treatments and vaccines
for COVID-19, and the dramatic global disparities
in access to these technologies. Although the public
made extraordinary investments in private companies’ vaccine research and development, details of
clinical trial data and government contracts remain
secret. For example, when immense public pressure
led to the release of US vaccine contracts in November 2020, the public learned that the Johnson &
Johnson contract explicitly allowed the company to
keep secret “production/manufacturing know-how,
trade secrets, [and] clinical data.”8 Similarly, the
European Commission’s first two publicly released
vaccine contracts include generous redactions of
alleged “confidential information,” including the
price per dose, the amount paid up front, and the
rollout schedule.9 We show why access to information that companies may (rightly or wrongly)
designate as trade secrets can be important for
public health, why the problem is becoming more
acute, and how states can interpret or revise trade
secrecy protections to enable them to promote access to medicines.
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The rise of trade secret protections
Trade secrecy law generally protects information
that is secret, commercially valuable because it is
secret, and subject to reasonable efforts to protect
its secrecy. Trade secret protections are distinct
from patents and copyrights. In certain ways, they
are weaker: unlike patents, trade secrets are not
protected from independent invention, and they
can be used or disclosed if they are discovered by
“fair” means. In other ways, they are stronger: both
patents and copyright protection are limited to a
specific number of years, but trade secret protections can be indefinite. Companies can claim trade
secret protection without any registration, and the
scope of these rights often become clear only after
litigation. Trade secret protections are also not subject to clear exceptions and limitations, such as the
“fair use” right in copyright.
The history of trade secrecy law is obscure and
disputed, and no major body of scholarship summarizes the transnational evolution of trade secret
protection. Broadly speaking, however, protection
for trade secrecy follows an arc similar to other
forms of intellectual property, growing stronger in
many jurisdictions in recent decades.10
One difficulty tracing the evolution of trade
secrecy law around the world is the wide array of
ways that states protect trade secrets. Many common law legal traditions, for example, have long
protected certain kinds of business information
through the rubric of unfair competition law or
contract law.11 A competitor stealing information
from another could be liable in tort, and an employee who reveals a secret they promised to protect
could be liable in contract. Over time, courts have
expanded these rights—for example, by implying
contracts in certain settings and by preventing
the use of trade secrets by some third parties who
obtain them improperly. In civil law settings, commercial secrets have commonly received protection
under regulation and statute, such as general laws
protecting fair competition.12 Many Asian countries
have historically protected trade secrets through
informal norms and business relationships rather
than through legal means. Countries have thus
not always had—and still today do not necessarily
JUNE 2021
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have—a special domain of “trade secrets law.” In
India, for example, commercial secrets are not protected as such, but can be protected via the law of
contracts and misappropriation. In Germany, trade
secrets are protected in a general fair competition
statute. In Malaysia, the law of confidence generally governs confidential commercial information,
while in Chile the only reference to trade secrets is
in criminal law provisions.
In the United States, however, there are a few
clear inflection points that show the increased
strength of this area of law. Until the 1980s, the
leading source of guidance for courts was the Restatement (First) on Torts, which made it clear that
trade secrets were protected only in tort, as a violation of “of relationally specific duties,” and did not
reflect any “right of property in the idea.”13 In 1984,
however, the US Supreme Court declared that trade
secret rights were indeed a kind of property for the
purposes of the US Constitution and thus could be
protected from unlawful “takings” of private property—meaning that a government that improperly
revealed a trade secret would be required to pay
compensation.14 Early cases in the US and the First
Restatement often treated the core information
protectable by trade secrecy as technical information about industrial processes and formulas.15
Today, the US legal framework, shaped largely by
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, defines the scope
of trade secrets far more broadly, as covering any
“information” that is commercially valuable, secret,
and subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret.16
In 2016, the US Congress additionally passed the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, expanding the law again
by providing federal jurisdiction for cases involving
the misappropriation of trade secrets. After advocacy regarding the conflict of trade secrets with
public interests in access to information, the law
also incorporated limited “whistleblower” protections, limiting criminal and civil liability for those
disclosing a trade secret pursuant to reporting a
suspected violation of the law.17
In combination with the rise of information
technologies and the “informationalization” of the
economy, these shifts have had substantial implications. Businesses in the United States can now
NUMBER 1
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claim as their property not just secret formulas but
an almost limitless range of information and data,
even if such claims might not hold up in court.
The implications for public access to information
are formidable. In 2001, for example, a US appeals
court held that a state could not require the public
disclosure of all of the ingredients in cigarettes,
even if this disclosure might benefit public health,
unless the state first paid the company for “taking”
its trade secrets.18
The 1980s and 1990s also marked a moment
when the United States and other wealthy countries made strengthened intellectual property law
a significant trade priority, pressing developing
countries in particular to adopt stronger intellectual property rights.19 The WTO’s 1995 TRIPS
Agreement played a significant role here. All members of the WTO must adhere to it, and violations
of TRIPS are actionable in dispute resolution. Trade
sanctions are also possible where countries do not
bring their law into compliance.20 Under article
39 of TRIPS, countries must provide protection
for “undisclosed information,” provided that the
information is sufficiently secret, “has commercial
value because it is secret,” and has been “subject
to reasonable steps under the circumstances” to
keep it secret. Drafters refrained from using the
term “trade secret” to avoid associations with any
particular legal system, and the requirement of
protection for “undisclosed information” does not
require a US-style trade secrets law.21 International
commitments thus give countries many flexibilities
with respect to how they implement protection.22
Wealthy countries have regularly sought to
increase protections for trade secrets in bilateral
and multilateral agreements.23 For example, the recent United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the
result of the renegotiation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, includes “the most robust
protection for trade secrets of any prior [US] agreement.”24 It obligates parties to provide both civil
and criminal remedies for the misappropriation
of trade secrets, judicial procedures to prevent the
disclosure of trade secrets during litigation, and
corresponding penalties. These measures were not
required by earlier instruments such as TRIPS. The
132
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agreement also makes it more difficult for regulators to seek “confidential business information”
from commercial entities for certain products.25
This and other bilateral and multilateral agreements contribute to the rising floor of international
trade secrecy protections.
As noted above, there do remain meaningful
cross-jurisdiction differences in the scope of trade
secret protections. But continued trade pressure
and efforts to attract foreign investment have led to
a recent wave of standardization, with major laws
protecting trade secrets recently passed around
the world, including in China, Thailand, Taiwan,
and Japan.26 The European Parliament and Council adopted a directive in 2016, which requires all
European Union (EU) member states to amend
their existing laws to comply with a minimum
level of trade secrecy protection. Importantly, the
directive provides some room for local variation in
implementation and also provides exceptions to the
enforcement of trade secret laws where, for example, disclosure of the trade secret was for purposes
of reporting wrongdoing or protecting a “legitimate
interest recognized by Union or national law.”27

Uses of trade secrets and consequences for
access to medicines
As the scope of protectable trade secrets has expanded, companies have claimed trade secret or
trade secret-like protections for many types of information relevant to health. The consequences for
the ability of all people to access safe and affordable
medicines are significant.

Clinical trial data
Understanding the safety and efficacy of medicines
on the market is crucial for public health.28 Pharmaceutical companies regularly collect safety and
efficacy data, including individual participant data,
metadata (such as trial protocols for interpreting
results), and summary-level data.29 Health regulators require companies to submit clinical trial data
to assess the safety and efficacy of proposed medicines. (Fewer data may be required for technologies
such as diagnostics, and there is no clear regulatory
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framework yet for newer technologies such as
health apps.) Companies do, however, commonly
invoke trade secret protections to prevent or limit
the disclosure of data to outside researchers or the
public.
Keeping such data secret has significant consequences. First, regulators are often understaffed
and under pressure to approve medicines quickly,
and they sometimes make mistakes. Without access to clinical trial data, researchers cannot verify
or investigate a medicine’s claimed benefits and
risks. There are many examples where serious—
sometimes deadly—side effects, or a lack of efficacy,
were revealed only many years after a drug has
been on the market, because clinical trial data were
kept secret from researchers. Prominent examples
include rofecoxib (Vioxx), estrogen hormone therapy (Prempro), and extended-release oxycodone
(OxyContin).30
Clinical trial secrecy can also obstruct the
proper operation of health technology assessments,
which contribute to health care provision and
reform. Health technology assessments “provide
a range of stakeholders … with accessible, usable
and evidence-based information to guide decisions
about the use and diffusion of technology and
efficient allocation of resources.”31 For example,
they are used to make recommendations about the
proper pricing of medicines and how to channel
funds toward research that will have the most value
for patients. However, health technology assessments can only function when they have sufficient
information about the drugs and devices they are
assessing.
Researchers can also make new uses of clinical trial data where they are available, such as to
predict how subgroups will respond to a medicine
or to understand the natural course of a disease. In
the case of COVID-19 vaccines, for example, access
to clinical trial data and post-market surveillance
data may help researchers understand more about
COVID-19 infection and immune responses, as well
as ask new questions about the safety and efficacy
of the vaccines.32 Strong advocacy around access to
data has had a significant impact in this context. US
regulators released detailed summaries—although
JUNE 2021
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not all data—about vaccines during the regulatory
process, and companies have published key trials
relatively quickly. These measures have helped
scientists understand and debate their efficacy and
have likely bolstered public trust in regulatory processes and vaccines.
Access to study protocols is critical for allowing researchers to interpret trial results and to
evaluate whether a study’s design can produce the
information needed. For example, when several
companies testing COVID-19 vaccines, after public
pressure, voluntarily agreed to release the secret
protocols for their studies, this allowed researchers
to evaluate the endpoints used, enabling debate
about how well the vaccines will protect against
transmission and not just against severe disease.
When protocols are public, it is also possible to
identify improper “outcome switching” or “data
dredging,” which occurs when researchers change
the primary outcome measures during the analysis
stage from those identified in the study protocol
to those that make their study results appear more
favorable.33
Second, inhibiting public access to clinical trial data undermines the development of new drugs.
Under the current regime, companies and regulators need not disclose the existence of, much less
the data from, failed or abandoned preclinical studies and clinical trials.34 This practice drives up the
costs of drug development and undermines innovation because researchers cannot “learn from the
failures of previous medical products in subsequent
research programs.”35 Lack of access to this information may result in unnecessary and unethical
human and animal experimentation as companies
remake and retest unsuccessful compounds.

Engineering and manufacturing data
Even after patent and data exclusivity periods
for drugs expire, trade secret protections permit
pharmaceutical companies to keep the precise
composition or manufacturing process for medications confidential. This effectively slows the release
of generic competitor drugs by preventing their reliance on existing engineering and manufacturing
data. As a consequence, drug companies can preNUMBER 1
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serve monopolies on medications that are difficult
to reverse engineer.
Trade secret protections can effectively
lengthen exclusivity periods for biological medicines in particular. In the case of “small molecule”
medicines, which are synthesized in chemical reactions, a researcher can chemically reverse engineer
the product. However, biologics, a newer group of
medications that are often grown in or derived from
living organisms, are more difficult to replicate.
Biologics, composed of complex protein or other
macromolecules and compositions, are comparatively difficult to produce, and their efficacy and
safety depend on the specific conditions of their
manufacture.36 To produce follow-on biologics,
researchers would benefit from access to manufacturing information, which includes the specific cell
line used, the host organism from which the cells
were taken, the variable introduced to arrive at the
final cell line selection, the method of optimization
for the culture medium, the production environment used to grow the cells, and the procedure for
isolation and purification of the relevant protein,
among other data.37
Access to these alleged trade secret resources
and information would also lighten the regulatory
burden and therefore hasten consumers’ access to
critical medicines. Health regulators treat biosimilars differently from small-molecule medications.
For example, the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) currently approves biosimilars only if testing
demonstrates that they are sufficiently biosimilar
to the original product.38 However, these time-consuming testing requirements could be simplified if
regulators could be confident that the biosimilar
was produced with high fidelity to the originator’s
production. The licensing of trade secrets can allow
production under the originator’s regulatory approval, and information exchange can also enable
independent production of biological generics or
biosimilars. Without access to alleged trade secret
biologic resources and production information, the
approval of biosimilars can take longer, leading to
higher prices for originator products.39 This ultimately drives up the cost of health care and reduces
patients’ access to critical, cutting-edge biological
134
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vaccines and treatments for conditions, including
rheumatoid arthritis, anemia, multiple sclerosis,
and cancer.40 Given the importance of the rapid
scale-up of COVID-19 vaccines around the world,
many have advocated for the need for the transfer
and licensing of manufacturing information in this
context.41
Trade secret protections may also be used to
inhibit access to engineering and manufacturing
data for vaccines and diagnostics, such as those
critical to resolving the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.42
Most diagnostics, such as those used for rapid
testing for the virus, “are being developed commercially and with proprietary technology,” meaning
that concerns about proprietary barriers to scaleup are particularly acute.43 And while a great deal
of public funding is being dedicated to developing
vaccines and therapeutics, there does not appear
to be any concerted effort on the part of funders
to insist on either open access to resulting data or
the sharing of trade secrets to ensure the possibility of competitive manufacture.44 To resolve this
pandemic, a coordinated effort must be made to
increase capacity for testing, tracing, vaccinating,
and treating, particularly among developing and
the least developed countries. Sharing data and
manufacturing know-how for diagnostics and vaccines will be crucial for enhancing production and
ultimately mitigating the harms of the COVID-19
pandemic. Trade secrecy laws obstruct these efforts.

Data related to artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence will likely permit important
advances in health care in the coming years and
decades. A subset of artificial intelligence known
as “machine learning” uses computer algorithms to
analyze large amounts of data, to identify patterns,
and to use these patterns to make predictions. The
technology is already widely deployed to determine who receives health and disability benefits,
to improve patient outcomes, to connect eligible
patients to clinical trials, and to promote drug
development.45
Without access to the algorithm and its underlying raw data, it can be difficult to identify
problems with these systems. This is a serious
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concern, because despite the perception of these
systems as “intelligent,” well-known biases can affect them.46 Access to algorithms and training data
not only allows for better evaluation but also allows
researchers with public health priorities in mind
to improve these technologies. Yet companies may
invoke trade secrets to guard predictive algorithms,
related artificial intelligence and machine learning
techniques, and the large datasets that these require
to function.

Drug pricing data
Pharmaceutical companies have invoked trade
secret protections and trade secret-like protections to limit access to various types of financial
information, including drug prices, research and
development costs, manufacturing costs, and
details regarding financial arrangements. In the
United States, for example, companies have litigated against transparency laws that sought to
require them to make the prices of their medicines
known to the public (when they might otherwise
remain obscured by secret rebates or other deals).
Collectively, we refer to these as “drug pricing
data” because they are all relevant to the matter of
fair pricing. The consequences of protecting this
information are significant. A lack of transparent
pricing information fuels high drug prices, while
obscuring the research and development costs limits our ability to calibrate innovation policy and to
identify price gouging.

Information about wrongdoing
Whistleblowers
are
individuals—commonly
employees—who reveal secret corporate information in order to hold companies accountable for
causing public harm. In some jurisdictions, trade
secret law recognizes an exception when the disclosure involves “information that is relevant to
public health or safety, or to the commission of a
crime or a tort, or to other matters of substantial
public concern.”47 However, such exceptions may
provide little solace to whistleblowers. In practice,
“potential whistleblowers face a gauntlet of legal
impediments, indoctrination policies, financial
risks, and workplace and social pressures discourJUNE 2021
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aging reporting of illegal conduct.”48 For example,
in the United States, employees have been found
liable for misappropriation for giving corporate
files to their attorneys, even in instances where they
were seeking to disclose illegal conduct.49
The stakes for establishing robust whistleblowing exceptions are high: insufficient protections
coupled with broad trade secrecy law can pose a
risk to public health. Without these protections,
employees may not disclose misconduct or errors
made by health care providers or firms.

Harmonizing trade secrecy law with the right
to health
Proponents of trade secrecy protections contend
that these protections encourage innovation by
limiting the flow of proprietary information. However, many of the kinds of data being claimed as
trade secrets are not clearly trade secrets.
One problem, to which some of the solutions
we describe below are addressed, is that trade secret law is very fact specific, making it hard to rule
out the possibility of trade secret protection for
any particular kind of information. However, it is
important to recognize that close scrutiny often
reveals trade secret claims to be inappropriate and
that careful studies have concluded that trade secret
law, properly understood, does not protect many
categories of information relevant to health. For example, although courts in the United States have at
times accepted the idea that prices can be trade secrets with little analysis, there are good arguments
based on the theory and purpose of trade secrets
law that the price alone should not be afforded such
protection. One argument is that price is simply
a deal point representing the culmination of adverse negotiations between buyers and sellers and
is not “an origin point for future development.”50
Concealing prices does not further innovation; it
simply undermines the capacity of competitors to
provide competitive pricing—hardly a purpose of
trade secrecy.51
Many types of clinical trial data should also
not be properly considered trade secrets. Most safety and efficacy data, for example, will not confer an
NUMBER 1
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advantage to competitors of the relevant kind—they
cannot, for instance, be used to market another
product or to reduce the costs of a competitor.52 The
data might be privately valuable to the originator
because they would reveal its product as harmful,
but that is not the kind of value that trade secrecy
law protects. Notably, the European Medical Association (EMA) has recognized in data-sharing
regulations that many kinds of safety and efficacy
data, such as trial endpoints, statistical methods,
and adverse event information, are not protected
confidential commercial information.53 The EMA
has also concluded that clinical trial protocols do
not qualify.54 US courts have held the same, noting
that they contain “no information about secret
formulas or rare treatment methods” and do not
identify innovative procedures or techniques.55
Timing can also influence whether the disclosure of information would produce a competitive
harm. For example, releasing research and development costs after sending the relevant product to
market would be unlikely to produce a competitive
disadvantage.56 In addition, the disclosure of aggregated data is unlikely to result in competitive harm.
How, then, can states create or expand
safeguards against overly expansive trade secret
protections? Three areas deserve particular attention. First, states should guard against the
entrenchment of trade secrets as human rights or
constitutional rights and reject attempts to enshrine stronger trade secrets law in international
law, particularly without adequate and explicit protection of safeguards. Second, states should protect
the public’s interest in health data by limiting trade
secret law and allowing it to be overridden where
public health benefits are salient. Third, countries
should adopt robust whistleblower safeguards.

Avoiding the entrenchment of trade secret
protections
Trade secret law has not been upwardly harmonized
in international law to the same degree as other
kinds of intellectual property. It will be important
for countries to maintain policy space to modify
and adjust domestic trade secret law, particularly
given how rapidly information technologies are
136
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evolving and the broad scope of trade secret law
today.
Like other forms of intellectual property,
trade secret rights are predominantly held by
corporations and do not have the status of human
rights, nor should they. These rights emerged out
of practices that protected commercial morality
and fairness between business competitors, and
they have no grounding in the rights reflected in
international human rights treaties.
States should also consider carefully the
implications of treating trade secrecy as a form
of property subject to protection under domestic
constitutional law. The US experience shows that
treating trade secrets as constitutionally protected
property creates real risks for the publicity of health
information, as in the tobacco case mentioned
above. If trade secrets are protected as property,
states are more limited in their ability to require
the sharing of health data to improve outcomes
or to develop new technologies, for example, because they may only do so after compensating
the originator. Trade secret law is also plausibly
understood more as a means to regulate behavior
in the commercial sphere—a kind of tort or unfair
competition law—rather than a right that is “good
against the world” that should properly be deemed
“property” for constitutional purposes. It is also not
obvious that judicial review and mandatory compensation are essential to protect private interests:
states can voluntarily afford compensation to companies when needed to protect incentives without
judicial mandates.

Allowing public interest exceptions to trade
secrecy
Public interest exceptions to trade secrecy can help
ensure that data can be shared to benefit public
health. These exceptions can be codified in at least
four ways: first, states can require the proactive
disclosure of health information where there is no
conflict with trade secrecy law; second, states can
exclude information from the scope of trade secret
protections; third, states can adopt “balancing
tests” that allow the release of trade secrets where
the public’s interest outweighs private harm; and
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fourth, states can use post hoc techniques such as
intellectual property “pools” and compensation
schemes to overcome barriers to data sharing.
First, mandatory, proactive disclosure requirements for certain health and safety information can
advance the public interest. The scope and timing
of these disclosure requirements can be carefully
tailored to balance industry interests and public
health concerns. For example, in the United States,
as part of a settlement in a lawsuit brought by Public Citizen, the FDA began releasing key advisory
committee materials, such as safety and efficacy
data and FDA reviews of new drug applications,
on its website 24 hours before advisory committee
meetings.57 Previously, these materials were accessible to the public only after a drug was approved. The
careful timing requirements on these mandatory
disclosures allow interested parties to participate
meaningfully in committee meetings, while also
negating industry arguments that disclosure will
unduly benefit competitors. The United States also
releases a substantial amount of summary data via
a website called ClinicalTrials.gov, under a statutory mandate that requires such data to be shared.
The data involved—summary information about
trials underway and their results—are general
enough that companies have not argued that the
law “takes” their property or improperly discloses
trade secrets. A great deal of important summary
information that would otherwise be held in secret
has been disclosed in this fashion. A key requirement for this disclosure is a regulatory requirement
for data sharing from the private company to regulators; countries should ensure that the right to
market medicines is contingent on the transfer of
relevant data to regulators and should make clear
that they will disclose such information to the public as needed to protect public health.
Proactive disclosure statutes can also be styled
to create a presumption of transparency rather
than confidentiality. Vanessa’s Law, adopted in
Canada in 2014, requires manufacturers to release
certain clinical trial data and provides the minister
of health discretion to release additional information (including confidential business information)
without the drug maker’s consent, if the minister
JUNE 2021
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“believes that the product may present a serious
risk of injury to human health.”58 While Vanessa’s
Law and its amendments provide procedures for
companies to object to disclosures, the public’s interest is presumptively safeguarded. 59 There must
also be efforts to monitor how laws providing for
mandatory disclosure are implemented at the regulatory level.
Second, excluding certain public health information from the scope of trade secret protections can
advance the public interest. Some information can
be released, as described above, because it does not
meet the definition of a trade secret. But states can
also amend existing trade secret laws to broaden
the ability to safely disclose information, wherever
it would benefit health and safety. A narrower definition of trade secrets that excludes information of
public interest could help enable more information
to be disclosed through public information requests
and limit measures that companies might take to
threaten whistleblowers. It may also disincentivize
companies from filing gratuitous trade secrets lawsuits. An exclusion of health and safety information
from the proprietary scope of trade secrecy also
resolves concerns that mandated disclosures constitute illegal government takings.
Third, affording public health weight in balancing tests can advance the public interest. Many
countries already incorporate public interest overrides or balancing tests into their information access
laws. The aforementioned EU directive explicitly
allows for EU or national rules that require the
public disclosure of trade secrets for the purpose of
protecting the public interest.60 In the United Kingdom, the Freedom of Information Act “subjects its
‘commercial interests’ exemption to a public interest
balancing test: a public authority may only refuse to
provide confidential information if it believes that,
‘in all the circumstances of the case, the public
interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs
the public interest in disclosing the information.’”61
Similarly, in India, the Right to Information Act of
2005 stipulates that protected information may be
disclosed once a “competent authority is satisfied
that larger public interest warrants the disclosure
of such information.” The law further states that “a
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public authority may allow access to information,
if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the
harm to the protected interests.”62
Countries that do not have such balancing
tests should consider adopting them. In the United
States, for example, the Freedom of Information
Act lacks clarity on when the public interest should
be balanced against private rights. US courts regularly weigh the public interest when parties seek to
withhold information under exemption 6 (personal
privacy interests) and exemption 7 (governing
information collected for law enforcement purposes). Recent cases arguing that the same balancing
applies under exemption 4, which governs trade
secrets and confidential commercial information,
are currently pending in courts.63
Fourth, developing mechanisms such as involuntary licenses or intellectual property “pools” can
override previously established in appropriate situations. If data have already been declared protected
as trade secrets, post hoc approaches for disclosure
may be necessary.
Where such data need to be pooled from many
sources, governments can seek to create voluntary
or mandatory “pools” that organize the terms under which such data will be shared. Recently, for
example, the president and minister of health of
Costa Rica wrote to the World Health Organization, urging it to “undertake an effort to pool rights
and technologies … useful for the detection, prevention, control, and treatment of the COVID-19
pandemic.”64 This effort would make available
via voluntary contribution all relevant research
and other information related to the COVID-19
response without conventional intellectual property barriers, in order to encourage “follow-on”
research and fast-track development of emerging
technology.65 The pool also ideally would provide
manufacturers license to use needed data once a
working technology is found.66 States may also
need to revise their laws to enable the entrance of
generics and biosimilars where compulsory licenses on patents and data have been issued, but data
exclusivity barriers exist. This post hoc approach
to pooling trade secrecy information (among other
intellectual property) may be particularly import138
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ant in emergencies, when longer-term solutions
may be impractical and a focus on particular technologies may be justified. However, a large-scale
voluntary waiver of numerous intellectual property protections may work only when there is near
universal consensus regarding the urgency of the
public health interests at play, and non-voluntary
sharing may be required.
Outside of pools, narrower mechanisms such
as involuntary licenses for the disclosure of specific
information, similar to compulsory licenses available in patents, should also be made available. These
licenses can be granted whenever public health
events arise that make the disclosure of data necessary, despite previous judgments or declarations
regarding their protected status. This is especially
important when the use of such data would lead
to more accessible medical products, such as is the
case with biosimilar or bioequivalent drugs and
vaccines, which often rely on clinical trial data
from originator drugs during the approval process.
Compensation can be afforded in these cases,
where disclosure is to or for the benefit of competitors. For example, in some instances when
regulators have allowed test data to be relied on
by subsequent entrants to a market, they have also
established liability schemes to ensure some limited payment to those who funded the creation of
the data.67 These schemes both dampen opposition
from originator companies and address concerns
about takings in the rare cases where these might
have merit.

Strengthening whistleblower protections
In order to safeguard access to safe and affordable medicines, trade secrecy law must provide
sufficient protections for whistleblowers. A model
whistleblower protection regime would (1) include
a reasonable belief standard and cover both illegal
conduct and wrongdoing; (2) reduce the risk of
negative consequences for whistleblowers; and (3)
provide for infrastructure, resources, and reporting channels that facilitate disclosure.68
Laws should facilitate disclosures by anyone
who has a reasonable belief that they may expose
illegal conduct or wrongdoing—even where disclo-
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sures may contain trade secrets.69 The reasonable
belief standard helps ensure that whistleblowers
do not bear too heavy a burden of proof. For example, the EU directive protects the disclosure of
information that the whistleblower perceives as
either illegal conduct or wrongdoing, in contrast
to US federal law, which protects the disclosure
only of illegal conduct. The EU standard protects
those without legal expertise and those who seek
to report unethical behavior that harms the public
interest.
Whistleblower protections must also ensure
the welfare of those making disclosures. Wherever possible, whistleblowers should be allowed
anonymity to prevent workplace retaliation. Interim relief from courts is also necessary where
workplace harassment does occur. To alleviate risk
further, when disclosures fail to meet a reasonable
belief standard, the law should not provide for
onerous remedies against whistleblowers, as these
disincentivize disclosures that may be valuable to
the public.
Regulatory protections for whistleblowers
are meaningful only if accompanied by infrastructure and resources that support disclosure.
Organizations and individuals that facilitate
whistleblowing—such as attorneys and nongovernmental organizations—must be afforded the
same protections as whistleblowers themselves.
Employees must also be informed of their rights as
potential whistleblowers and must have access to
pro bono legal representation when needed.

Addressing counter-arguments:
International obligations and innovation
The measures promoted above will neither contravene international law nor unduly undermine
innovation. As described in the first section,
international law requires that states implement
trade secrecy protections in a manner tailored to
protect the right to access essential medicines. The
TRIPS Agreement provides individual states broad
leeway in interpreting the purposefully flexible
requirements to prevent “undisclosed information”
from being used “in a manner contrary to honest
JUNE 2021
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commercial practices.”70 Nothing in article 39.2
prohibits states from creating exceptions to trade
secrecy protections, appropriately narrowing trade
secret protections, or mandating the sharing of
trade secrets where this would benefit health and
competition. TRIPS also includes broadly stated
purposes, for example noting in article 8 that members may “adopt measures necessary to protect
public health,” “promote the public interest,” and
“prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights”
as long as the measures are otherwise consistent
with the agreement.71 Article 7 also makes clear that
intellectual property rights should be implemented
in a manner that “contribute[s] to the promotion
of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
and obligations.” To that end, not only do these
proposed measures comply with TRIPS, but they
also facilitate the realization of some of the agreement’s core principles.72
In addition, state practice suggests that many
of the measures we propose are considered by members to be consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
Various states have already adopted public interest
measures similar to those recommended by this
paper. For example, the FDA, the EMA, and Health
Canada already proactively disclose certain clinical
trial data. The laws of several countries—including
England, Scotland, and India—compel the disclosure of confidential commercial information where
there exists an overriding public interest.73 Efforts
to refine and limit trade secrecy laws through the
countervailing safeguards for access to medicines
that we describe, are, we believe, fully consistent
with the flexible international protections for undisclosed information.
Advocates for broad trade secret protections
contend that trade secrecy law encourages innovation and so serves the public good. Under this
reasoning, trade secret protections ensure profits
for innovators by discouraging “free riding.”74
They also reduce the need for companies to invest
in inefficient security measures.75 Others see trade
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secrecy protection as an important supplement to
patent law because it does not require registration,
application, or publication and is low cost and long
lasting.76
It is important to recognize, however, that
overly broad trade secrecy law can impede innovation in a multitude of ways. Trade secrecy and
other intellectual property protections can create
dynamic inefficiencies by increasing the cost
of inputs—especially in the research context—
thereby frustrating innovation.77 Restrictions on
the exchange of information—for example, by
discouraging the movement of employees to new
employers—can also reduce spillovers of information to other firms. The unlimited duration of
trade secret law is also problematic from an innovation perspective, because companies can prevent
public access forever, avoiding the “quid pro quo”
disclosures of patent law. Indefinite protection is
also economically unnecessary under conventional
assumptions that companies “discount” the present-day value of protection that exists many years
in the future.
Moreover, in general, exclusive rights to information create inefficiencies because information
has a marginal cost of zero: it is costless to allow
others to enjoy knowledge once it is created, and so
from a static perspective should be priced at zero.
Limiting access to knowledge may be desirable if
it is needed to prevent free-riding problems. But,
even without trade secrecy protections, companies would still produce much of the information
that trade secrecy laws cover today. For example,
businesses create a great deal of secret information
simply because it is required by their business, including data demanded by regulators, and prices. A
lot of secret information is not expensive to create,
meaning that it is not subject to real free-riding
problems. In addition, as trade secrecy law has
expanded, it has come to implicate public interests—including interests in access to information
about products and corporate behavior—that are
essential to democracy and the public good. Those
who describe the incentive effects of trade secrets
law rarely consider these broad public implications,
the measures that may be needed to ensure that
140
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trade secrets do not overprotect information that
would be created anyway, or the law’s interference
with important public interests.

Conclusion
Access to medicines is integral to the right to
health. Today, commercial actors utilize trade
secrecy to hide numerous types of health-related
data, including clinical trial data, engineering and
manufacturing data, data related to algorithms and
machine learning, pricing data, and information
on corporate wrongdoing. The consequences for
access to medicines, and thus human rights, are
significant, undermining patient-level health, the
development of affordable treatments, and the
effectiveness of health systems as a whole. This
paper has proposed several measures that states
could adopt to protect against overly expansive
trade secrets regimes. By guarding against the entrenchment of trade secret law as creating “rights”
protected under international and domestic law,
by protecting the public interest in confidential
commercial information by allowing or mandating
data sharing, and by strengthening whistleblower
protections, countries can protect the pressing
public need for collaboration and transparency. In
so doing, countries can expand access to medicines
and promote the right to health.
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